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Abstract: 
This chapter analyzes the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind, in order to 
clarify in what ways how philosophy can contribute to neuroscience and how neuroscience can 
contribute to philosophy. Especially since 1980s and the emergence of “neurophilosophy”, more 
and more philosophers have been bringing home morals from neuroscience to settle philosophical 
issues. I mention examples from the problem of consciousness and philosophy of perception, and 
I argue that such attempts are not successful in trying to settle questions like whether psychology 
can be reduced to neuroscience or whether we see the external world directly in perception. The 
failure results from an ability of the philosophical questions to evade the data. What makes these 
questions persisting philosophical questions is precisely that there is no way to settle them through 
empirical evidence, as they are conceptual questions and their solution lies in conceptual analysis.  
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In this chapter, I chart the general territory of interdisciplinary interaction between analytic 
philosophy and brain sciences and the relevance the two fields have for each other. I differentiate 
two main styles of interaction, from philosophy-to-neuroscience and from neuroscience-to-
philosophy. The first type of interaction is motivated by the philosophers’ interest in the issues that 
arise within neuroscience, the findings of the field and the claims made by neuroscientists in the 
context of the philosophers’ function as a conceptual and logical corrector or aide towards a more 
accurate science. The other aspect concerns the relevance of the findings of neuroscience for the 
resolution of philosophical debates. I will make some brief remarks about the first, and then 
investigate more closely the second type of interaction. I will not discuss the controversial field 
called “experimental philosophy”.  
Especially since the 1980s and the emergence of “neurophilosophy”, more and more philosophers 
have been closely following the findings of neuroscience and other related sciences, and bringing 
home morals for philosophical questions. I will discuss whether these attempts succeed or not in 
working towards a resolution of philosophical debates. I will mention two cases, one regarding a 
puzzle in philosophy of perception and one regarding the mind-body problem, and I will argue that 
such attempts are not successful in trying to answer questions like whether we see the external 
world directly in perception or whether psychology can be reduced to neuroscience. 
This failure is not due to any problems with the neuroscientific data itself, but it results from an 
ability of the philosophical questions to evade the data, that is, the data mentioned fails to settle the 
philosophical debates conclusively. This has a reason: If those philosophical questions could be 
settled by empirical evidence, they wouldn’t be philosophical questions in the first place, they could 
be reframed as scientific, empirical questions. What makes these questions persisting philosophical 
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questions is precisely that there is no way to settle them through empirical evidence. Rather, they 
are conceptual questions, some of them also with phenomenological aspects, and their solution lies 
in conceptual analysis and/or phenomenological methods.  
 
1. Philosophy-to-Science: Ethics, logic, terminology and clarity 
There are many ways philosophy functions as an aide and an inspector for science. For continental 
philosophy, this is generally by highlighting and discussing various normative, political and 
societal aspects of scientific theories, terminologies and processes; but this article is about analytic 
philosophy, which I will refer simply as “philosophy” from now on. I will very briefly identify 
some functions of philosophy in relation to science. 
One contribution of analytic philosophy to sciences is through introducing new conceptual and 
terminological tools to a field (or the criticism of the introduction of such tools). For instance, the 
use of the term “representation” in cognitive neuroscience comes through a long philosophical 
tradition, a famous example promoting the use of such a conceptual scheme being Fodor’s seminal 
work (1975). This is of course something that is also often done by people who are not necessarily 
philosophers by profession but who are working on the theoretical levels in a scientific field. 
Another function common to both philosophers and scientists is asking questions that can inspire 
scientific work. Indeed, the philosopher and the theoretical scientist is hard to distinguish at this 
level. The philosophizing aspect of the philosopher comes into the picture where the contribution 
to be carried out by the philosopher involves the kind of conceptual analysis and logical 
argumentation typically found in analytic circles.  
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One thing a philosopher can do, qua philosopher, is to criticize a certain idea that appears in a 
scientific context on the grounds that it doesn’t logically follow from the evidence, or to criticize a 
terminology on the grounds that concepts deployed are problematic. To give an example, Bennet 
and Hacker criticize the conceptual background of neuroscience from a Wittgensteinian 
metaphilosophical perspective, arguing that many terms used in neuroscience are confused, in the 
sense that they rest on misunderstandings of terms in everyday vocabulary (Bennet and Hacker, 
2003). Another prominent example of this type of contribution is the debate that sparked by the 
empirical findings of Libet on the basis of which some claimed that we don’t have free will because 
before we are aware of a mental act of decision-making, a certain unconscious process which 
factors into which decision is to be made is already going on in our brains (Wegner, 2002). This 
conclusion was challenged by philosophers in many ways, for example, by claiming that it relies 
on a misunderstanding of the term “free will”: When one analyzes the concept, it is claimed, one 
sees that in order to freely perform actions one doesn’t need to be aware of a mental act of 
“deciding” or “willing”; in order for an action to be free other criteria are sufficient, such as the 
action’s being in line with one’s beliefs and desires, the decision not being taken under duress, etc. 
(See O’Connor 2010 for a review of various analyses of free will; also see Dennett 2003, ch. 8, for 
a criticism of Wegner.) 
We should recognize that many such debates around science are actually spillovers from 
philosophers’ debates. For instance, “qualia” is a term that has originally appeared in philosophical 
literature, and started to appear in certain scientific work especially after the 90s (see for instance 
Ramachandran and Hirstein 1997, Edelman and Tononi 2000). But many philosophers claim that 
the concept of qualia is confused and attempts to refer to something that doesn’t exist, if it is 
attempting to refer to an internal quality, and according to this view scientists who are trying to 
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solve the problem of qualia are dealing with a pseudo-problem. (Representationalists like Byrne 
(2006) or Wittgensteinians like Bennett and Hacker (2003) are examples.) This is nothing other 
than the philosophers’ debate carrying itself over to the battleground of science. Similarly, going 
back to the Libet example above, Dennett (2003) has claimed that the confusion regarding free will 
based on Libet’s experiments has a long philosophical background that goes back at least to 
Descartes. 
One last function of philosophy that should be mentioned is the role played by ethics in the context 
of science. Ethics of neuroscience is a relatively well-established field, involved in various 
important worldly matters such as neuromarketing, neuro-enhancement and animal 
experimentation. 
 
2. Science-to-Philosophy: Can scientific data settle philosophical debates? 
Now we will look at the other side of the interaction, taking empirical data and trying to come to 
conclusions regarding the traditional questions of philosophy. By going through two cases, one 
regarding the question of whether we see the outside world directly or not, and the other regarding 
the question of whether the mind can be reduced to the brain, I will try to show this direction of 
interaction is not very fruitful, for systematic reasons due to the nature of philosophical questions. 
There can of course be other ways of science-to-philosophy direction of intellectual contribution 
which I will not talk about, say, some new empirical data providing a good case example to discuss 
something in a philosophical context or triggering novel philosophical questions. An empirical 
finding can also have some relevance for ethics, for instance, if it turns out that a creature feels pain 
and pleasure we are obliged to behave differently towards that creature. It should be remembered, 
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however, that we have these obligations already in the context of a background ethical code, itself 
a matter of philosophical debate untouched by empirical evidence, like not causing unnecessary 
harm or not terminating otherwise pleasurable lives. 
 
       2.1. Case one: Philosophy of perception 
One philosophical question that persisted for centuries is whether we see the external world directly 
or not, whether the things we seem to be directly acquainted with in perception are objects and 
properties in the external world or whether they are internal or intermediary items in some sense. 
These intermediary items have went with various names, most famously “sense-data” or sometimes 
“sensations”. More recently, some have adopted the term “qualia” for this terminological purpose 
(Wright, 2008), even though more often the term has been deployed to mean something slightly 
different.  
Many philosophers and scientists have insisted that the findings of many empirical fields, 
particularly psychophysics and neuropsychology of conscious experience, has given us proof that 
“indirect realism”, the philosophical view that we don’t perceive the external world directly, is the 
correct view (Revonsuo, 2006, also see science-based articles in Wright, 2008). According to this 
approach, this centuries-old philosophical question has been waiting for the emergence of scientific 
evidence to be settled. However, unfortunately, the evidence doesn’t settle the issue, and even if it 
did, much simpler evidence could be just enough, without extensive modern-day research. 
The science-based approach to settle this question relies mainly on the fact that every type of 
experience one can have depends on a certain internal, neural state, which seems to be enough to 
have that type of experience without an external corresponding object, as it is the case in illusions, 
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dreams and hallucinations. One can see a sunset in a dream, one can see an object as blue even if 
it is some other color, or still have the lingering phantom feeling of an amputated arm. Since the 
hallucinatory cases and the externally-caused veridical counterparts are subjectively the same 
experiences, and since we are both aware of something in both cases, then, just like we are not 
directly aware of an external entity in the illusory cases, then we are not directly aware of the 
external world in the veridical cases either. Rather, what we are directly aware of are models or 
internal images constructed by the brain. This idea is also supplemented by the finding that there 
is a lot of constructive work going on in one’s brain during ordinary perception, say, the filling-in 
of the blind spot or various other “inferences” the perceptual system makes to construct an image 
of the world. 
This old philosophical argument that predates contemporary science is known as the “argument 
from error” (also “argument from hallucination” or “argument from illusion”) in the philosophical 
literature. Note that if the argument could settle the debate, it could have settled it a long time ago 
without help from rigorous empirical science of today, since hallucinations, illusions and dreams 
have long been well-known phenomena. One doesn’t need contemporary neuroscience to know 
that one can have the experience of seeming to see a particular object or particular quality without 
there being a corresponding thing in the environment. So, the first point is that, even if the empirical 
data could settle the issue, hard science wouldn’t be necessary.  
The second point is, the empirical evidence cannot settle the issue because the conclusion of the 
argument, that we do not see the world directly, rests on a particular understanding of certain terms 
like “seeing”. A common objection to the argument from error has been that when we hallucinate 
something, we don’t really see anything, rather, we “seem to see” something, we have a 
hallucinatory experience of seeing something with our eyes. So one cannot generalize from 
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hallucination to veridical perception and say that what we see in both cases is the same and 
therefore in veridical perception we don’t see the external world directly. In hallucination we are 
aware of something for sure, the “content” of our experience, but this doesn’t make it impossible 
for us to be in direct empirical touch with the external world. In hallucination, the content doesn’t 
match the outside world, in veridical perception, it matches, and via “having” this content (as 
opposed to “seeing” or “perceiving” this content) we are aware of the external world directly 
without being aware of anything else. It is indeed the case that the brain has some constructive role 
in everyday perception, and the sensory content regarding what is in front of us provided by this 
constructive processes partly distort our vision of what is out there, but still there is no conceptual 
obstacle to say that for what corresponds out there to the undistorted bit of the content, we see those 
aspects of the world directly. Think of a visual state which is partly illusory, you experience a scene 
which represents the world as mainly as it is but which includes the illusory appearance of a bent 
stick in water. Some would like to analyze this perceptual state as the brain constructing an image 
of the world that is partly incorrect, and the immediate object of our awareness is this internal 
image. But the brain’s construction of an image, a model, or an appearance of the outside world 
need not be analyzed in this epistemic way. One can as well say that as a result of some external 
and internal processes, the world appears to us in a certain way, and if this appearance is truthful, 
we see the world directly, and the misleading representation of the bent-stick-in-water shouldn’t 
be understood as “seeing” an image of a bent stick, but failing to see a particular spatial property 
of the stick because of having a misleading visual representation of the world. 
This is one among various responses given to the argument from hallucination. I am not interested 
in logically proving it here, but to demonstrate that one’s reliance on empirical data to argue for 
indirect realism rests on a certain understanding of certain concepts like seeing, awareness, 
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perception, etc., and this conceptual debate cannot be settled by empirical evidence. And if it could, 
we wouldn’t need hard science, since the mere existence of illusions and hallucinations could prove 
this point. 
  
2.2. Case two: The mind-body problem 
The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding what the relation between the mind and 
body is, or more precisely, whether mental phenomena are a subset of physical phenomena or not. 
There are many philosophical positions associated with this problem, substance dualism (“mind 
and body are two different substances”), property dualism (“there is only one, physical substance, 
but mental properties of subjects cannot be reduced to their physical properties”), and physicalist 
reductionism (“mental properties can be identified with, or can be spelled out in terms of, physical 
properties”), among other positions. 
Some philosophers in the past decades have argued that modern neuroscience has already given us 
an answer to this question: Mental states are nothing other than neural states, and we can talk of 
mental phenomena through physical vocabulary without any loss of meaning or reference. 
Founders of what is called “neurophilosophy”, Patricia and Paul Churchland, have been among the 
most famous advocates of this position, even though their views oscillated between reductionism 
and eliminativism, the latter view being that mentality (or certain aspects of it) is a pre-scientific 
construct that will have no place in the scientific understanding of the world once we have a fully 
developed neuroscience (See for instance Churchland, 1988). 
This brand of reductionism relies heavily on the findings of neuroscience, often on quite detailed 
empirical data about the relation between certain psychological states and brain states or how neural 
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processes generate behavior. Well, almost all brands of reductionism have some reference or other 
to the brain science, but they are often uninterested in detailed data. Rather, they simply point to 
the general scientific consensus that there is a very direct relation between mental and neural states, 
but this relation by itself does not play an important role in their arguments, for these arguments 
generally rely on a conceptual analysis of mental states to see if mental states could be reduced to 
any physical states to begin with, and if such reduction is possible, modern day science tells us 
which physical states are the reduction base, which turns out to be neural or bodily states. On the 
other hand, the kind of reductionism we are interested in here takes it that science has proven mind-
brain identity. 
The scientific evidence, however, does not settle the philosophical question. No matter what 
detailed and direct mapping we establish between mental and neural states, there are so many 
options that remain on the table before we proclaim that we have reduced mental processes to brain 
processes. The first obstacle is that correlation does not mean identity, and the reductionist should 
answer arguments to the effect that the relation is better explained as a correlation. The most 
important and pervasive argument I will mention here is the argument that, to put it roughly, the 
reduction of mental phenomena to physical phenomena does not make sense, on conceptual or 
logical grounds. A phenomenon described by a physical description like “such and such 
connectivity and firing in this and that brain area” simply cannot be identical to “feeling pain” or 
“thinking about Budapest” or “having a visual experience of a yellow lemon” as these mental 
phenomena described have certain characteristics that the physical description does not capture, 
even though anti-reductionist philosophers disagree on what these characteristics are. Some say it 
is some subjective aspect, the “feel” or “what-it-is-likeness” associated with the mental state, some 
say it is “intentionality”, the property of “having a content” or “being directed to an object”, such 
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as the object experienced or thought about. When we are given a description like “such and such 
neural firing”, we cannot infer whether this state is an experience of color green or color red or 
something else. This disparity is termed “the explanatory gap”: A successful reduction, it is argued, 
should tell us not only an identity based on an observation of a correlation between the occurrence 
of mental and neural states, but also make us understand how is it possible that such and such 
mental firing could constitute experiencing the color red (Levine, 2001). Another very different 
anti-reductionist argument, a behaviorist one, is the argument that the mind cannot be the brain 
because mental terms do not strictly refer to states or processes, but dispositions to behave, and it 
doesn’t make sense to identify a disposition with a state or process (Ryle, 1949) 
Philosophers have answers to these challenges of course. Some claim that identities don’t require 
an explanation (Block and Stalnaker, 1999), some try to analyze mental phenomena into physical 
or “topic-neutral” vocabulary (vocabulary that is common both to physical and mental terminology, 
such as the vocabulary of basic ontological phenomena like causation; the approach was 
popularized by Smart (1959) and many causal-informational analyses of mental phenomena can 
be considered as a continuation of this strategy). To give a more specific example, some 
philosophers like Millikan analyze mental states as natural indicators, “thinking of X” is being in 
a state which has the function of indicating the presence of X. So in case of humans, it is a brain 
state that has acquired the biological function of signaling the presence of X through the organism’s 
interaction with its environment (Millikan, 1984). Again, it is not important for us here whether 
this analysis is correct or not. But if this analysis is correct, then there is no obstacle for mental 
states to be reduced to neural states ---as instances at least, if not as scientific or functional kinds, 
since different types of neural states can realize the same mental state--- and one doesn’t need to 
look at detailed empirical data to claim that reduction is possible, given that every mental state will 
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correlate with some neural state. From then on, if Millikan’s analysis is accepted, whether mental 
state M is identical to neural state N is philosophically uninteresting in the context of the mind-




The two examples above have shown us that philosophical puzzles cannot be settled by empirical 
evidence, and it is not due to any specific features of these two cases, it is something that results 
from the nature of philosophical questions. Philosophical questions are often classified as questions 
of a logical or conceptual nature. But let’s avoid here the task of defining what a philosophical 
question is, it is enough to mention a negative aspect: Philosophical questions are not empirical 
questions. If they could be conclusively settled down by empirical evidence, then they would be 
turned into scientific questions and taken from the hands of philosophers. This is arguably what 
happened with some philosophical questions in the past, questions that stopped being philosophical 
questions and turned into questions of physics or biology, such as some questions regarding spatio-
temporal behavior of objects, questions regarding basic elements, some questions related to vision, 
and issues about the origins and diversity of life forms. (Think of ancient Greek theories of objects 
moving towards their “natural place” or the philosophical theory of vision that postulated beams 
emitted by the eyes.) Answering questions like whether we see the world directly or whether 
mentality can be reduced to physics requires first of all an agreement on what “seeing the world 
directly” means or what we mean by “mentality” or “reduction”. And when they are settled, we 
still won’t be able to say that the “philosophical question” can be answered empirically, because 
the philosophical part of the question would already be solved. 
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Another point about this non-empirical nature of philosophical questions is that their solution is of 
little or no practical concern. If we cannot settle a question empirically, that is, by intervening with 
the world and then observing the outcomes, then the settlement of the question won’t give us any 
advantage of intervening with the world to bring about outcomes either. Of course if a philosophical 
question has an ethical or normative aspect, then one’s converging on one answer or the other has 
consequences for one’s personal behavior or how we conduct science. But otherwise, the resolution 
of the mind-body problem or the philosophical problems of perception don’t seem to add anything 
to our ability in scientific contexts, in terms of, say, prediction or engineering. No matter the mental 
properties are identical to neural properties or are just irreducible and systematically correlated 
with neural properties, we still get the same results in neuroimaging or behavioral neuroscience. 
No matter we see the world directly or not, we get the same results in psychophysics. Still, one can 
expect a scientist to be careful about what background philosophical view she takes, if she takes 
any at all, while using a set of terms and concepts in relation to the scientific work. This means 
either putting the philosophical questions aside, or, when making big claims, being aware of rich 
and complicated debates going on in the contemporary philosophical background surrounding such 
issues. Well, the very act of looking into the brain and acquiring the data itself rests on certain 
background philosophical assumptions, but many are unimportant in the particular context of the 
interaction of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Instead, they are related to general 
philosophical issues surrounding science and observation, and a scientist cannot be expected to 
worry about all such philosophical problems before taking up some work. But after the empirical 
part is done, when one starts making claims like there is no free will, the mind is the brain or we 
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